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INTRODUCTION
Across the country, storefront window displays have become frames
for large neon posters that scream: “Going out of business!”; entrances
have been adorned with large yellow banners proclaiming in bold
letters: “Everything Must Go!” In a matter of weeks, store shelves that
were once fully stocked become victims of savage bargain hunters.
Eventually, the stores are stripped clean until only the bolted down
shelves remain. It is a scene that has unfolded uniformly at myriad
retail locations of Sharper Image, Bombay Co., Linens ’n Things, and
1
Circuit City. Today, these stores have become empty shells, serving
2
only as blighted reminders of hard economic times. Yet, even as
bargain hunters have snatched up every ionic air cleanser, incense
holder, pillow sham, and cell phone charger from these bankrupt
3
retailers, the most valuable asset remains—the store’s brand.
Investors know that while a company may be bankrupt in the sense
4
of its hard assets, significant value remains in the brand itself. For
1. Amy Zipkin, Brand Names Live after Stores Close, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, at B1.
2. For the 12-month period ending September 30, 2009, business filings totaled 58,721,
up 52% from the 38,651 business filings in the 12-month period ending September 30, 2008;
Chapter 11 filings rose 68%, increasing from 8,799 in fiscal year 2008 to 14,745 in fiscal year
2009. Press Release, U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings up 34 Percent over Last Fiscal Year
(Nov.
29,
2009),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2009/BankruptcyFilingsSep2009.cfm.
3. In 2009, one firm paid $175 million to buy the Sharper Image, Linens ‘n Things, and
Bombay brands. Zipkin, supra note 1; see also Tom Hals, Bankrupt KB Toys Trademark,
Aug.
6,
2009,
available
at
Logos
Sold
at
Auction,
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0631809020090806 (stating bankrupt toy retailer sold its
trademark, logos, and web addresses for $2.1 million).
4. Rob Walker, Cleaned Sheets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at MM18; A trademark
may be valued in several different ways. See Michael J. Freno, Trademark Valuation:
Preserving Brand Equity, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1055 (2007) (explaining valuation of marks
for damages calculations and other purposes). While a trademark is legally protectable, the
concept of a “brand” is a broader, non-legal characterization of a trademark. Id. at 1056.
Like trademarks, brands can designate the source of a product or service, but they
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example, The Sharper Image, which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in 2008, is no longer a retail company with stores and retail
associates. Instead, The Sharper Image has reincarnated itself as a
5
“global lifestyle brand licensor.” So while a customer can no longer
walk into a Sharper Image store and try out the “deluxe shiatsu foot
massager,” a customer in search of the “Sharper Image experience” can
still buy Sharper Image licensed merchandise at Macy’s, Best Buy, or
6
OfficeMax. Thus, The Sharper Image has reorganized itself from a
failed capital-based business, to a more sustainable royalty-driven
business that exploits the value of its brand, and its trademark in
7
particular.
Although THE SHARPER IMAGE trademark has found a happy
ending in life after bankruptcy, that is not always the case for trademark
licensees. Rather, for licensees, the intersection of trademark law and
bankruptcy law has largely been a train wreck: The courts are divided
8
over debtor-licensee rights, and Congress has neglected the problem.
9
As trademark rights become an increasingly valuable asset in
go further, conveying information about a particular product or service, the core
trademark behind the brand, other trademarks supporting the brand, any family of
marks, domain names, sub-brands, product packaging, the manufacturer and its
trade name, advertising of the product, distribution of the product, celebrity
endorsements, and even the shelf displays at retailers and/or displays on the
Internet.
Id. Interbrand, a leading surveyor of international brand value, determines brand value as a
“financial representation of a business’ earnings due to the superior demand created for its
products and services through the strength of its brand.” Interbrand, Interbrand’s Method for
Valuating
the
Best
Global
Brands,
available
at
http://www.interbrand.com/best_global_brands_methodology.aspx?langid=1000 (last accessed
Jan. 10, 2010). According to Interbrand, the most valuable global brands in 2009 were:
CocaCola, $69 million; IBM, $60 million; Microsoft, $57 million; GE, $48 million; and Nokia,
$35
million.
Interbrand,
Best
Global
Brands
2009,
available
at
http://www.interbrand.com/images/studies/-1_BGB2009_Magazine_Final.pdf.
5. Eric Taub, Sharper Image Stores Are Dead, but the Brand Goes On, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2009, at B4.
6. The Sharper Image branded merchandise is available at Macy’s and JCPenney.
Zipkin, supra note 1; Taub, supra note 5. The Sharper Image products are marketed by
several
licensees.
See
“Licensing
Opportunities,”
http://www.sharperimageusa.com/#licensing (last visited Mar. 15, 2010); “The Sharper Image
by S.I. Products,” http://www.siproducts.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
7. Zipkin, supra note 1.
8. See generally 11 U.S.C § 101(35A) (2006); N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. Blanks (In re
N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc.), 337 B.R. 230, 235–36 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005), aff’d, 2008 WL
2192094 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009); Stuart M. Riback,
Intellectual Property Licenses: The Impact of Bankruptcy, 985 PLI/PAT 657, 672 (Oct.-Dec.
2009).
9. WESTON ANSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUATION: A
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10

Chapter 11 reorganizations, it is critical for Congress and the courts to
clarify how trademarks will be treated in bankruptcy. Resolution is
particularly important for trademark licensees seeking to revive their
businesses through reorganization. Recent cases demonstrate that
Chapter 11 reorganization may not be a viable option for businesses
that depend on licensing. Rather, most courts will allow a licensor to
strip the bankrupt licensee of its rights, therefore stifling any chance of a
licensee’s successful reorganization.
This Comment urges that a trademark licensee should not be
stripped of its licensing rights simply because the licensee enters
bankruptcy. Instead, where a licensee intends only to continue using an
existing license under the terms of the existing agreement with the
licensor, the licensee’s use of that license should be uninterrupted
during reorganization. This recommendation, contrary to the position
of trademark licensors, will not invade the province of trademark
owners to control their marks.
To support this recommendation, this Comment examines the
statutory frameworks of both trademark law and bankruptcy law,
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, and cases that illuminate the
current circuit split over the rights of a trademark licensee in
bankruptcy. Building on these elements, this Comment outlines an
analytical approach that strikes a balance between the need for business
reorganization and the duty of a trademark licensor to exercise control
over its mark.
Accordingly, this Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides
a brief overview of the purposes of trademark law and bankruptcy law
and also explains why these areas of law conflict. Part II introduces In
re N.C.P. Marketing Group to explain the two analytical frameworks—
the “hypothetical test” and the “actual test”—used by the courts to
11
determine the rights of a trademark licensee in bankruptcy. Part III
explains how federal circuit courts have employed these differing
approaches—including one court that has attempted an end run around
the issue. Finally, this Comment concludes that courts should adopt the
actual test to balance the interests of both trademark licensors and
debtor-licensees.

PRIMER FOR IDENTIFYING AND DETERMINING VALUE 169 (2005).
10. Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property: An Economic
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 769 (2007).
11. In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc., 337 B.R. at 236.

STEELE 5-17-10

2010]

5/19/2010 2:29 PM

TRADEMARK LICENSEE RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY

415

PART I
A. Trademark Law vs. Bankruptcy Law: Competing Interests
Trademark law and bankruptcy law are both concerned with the
12
“use” of assets. For example, trademarks are given protection for their
13
use in commerce. And in bankruptcy, assets are used to pay creditors
14
and as leverage for the debtor’s “fresh start.” Yet, unlike physical
assets, a trademark is not valuable in and of itself. Rather, the value of
a trademark depends on the underlying business it symbolizes. This
interdependent relationship creates competing interests between the
trademark licensor and the debtor-licensee: On one hand, the
trademark licensor will seek to protect its mark from any loss of control
and ultimate harm to its business by snatching back the license. On the
other hand, a debtor-licensee whose business depends on the license will
seek to use the license as leverage to keep its business going. Yet, if the
licensor strips the licensee of the right to use the mark, the licensor will
virtually ensure the failure of the licensee’s bankruptcy reorganization.
Courts that permit a licensor to strip a licensee of its right to use a
mark favor the protectionist principles of trademark licensing while
entirely frustrating the purpose of bankruptcy reorganization. Instead,
Congress and the courts must balance the rights of a trademark owner
to protect its mark, and the ability of a business to reorganize.
This Part will first briefly explain the unique purposes of trademark
law and bankruptcy law. Second, this Part will explain the existing
conflict between these two areas of law.
1. Trademark Law Purpose
A trademark is defined under the Lanham Act as a word, phrase,
12. To register a mark, the Lanham Act requires that a ‘mark is in use in commerce.”
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(c) (emphasis added). Bankruptcy law addresses the use of a debtor’s
assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1); see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918) (“The
federal system of bankruptcy . . . intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh
start in life . . . after the property which he owned at the time of bankruptcy has been
administered for the benefit of creditors.”).
13. See Mountain Top Beverage Group, Inc. v. Wildlife Brewing N.B., Inc., 338 F.
Supp. 2d 827, 833 (2003) (stating “[b]ecause the power of Congress to register a mark stems
from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, a trademark must be used in interstate or
foreign commerce as that is the commerce Congress may lawfully regulate.”). See, e.g.,
KENNETH L. PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 51 (1999) (“Rather than
being based on the Patent and Copyright Clause, congressional authority to regulate
trademarks is based on the Commerce Clause. This is why interstate commerce or ‘use’ of a
trademark is crucial for federal protection.”).
14. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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logo, or symbol used in commerce to signify a source, to distinguish the
15
source from competitors, and to prevent confusion in the marketplace.
Accordingly, a trademark owner is given the right to protect its mark
16
against infringement and dilution through blurring and tarnishment.
The Lanham Act also allows the trademark owner to benefit from the
goodwill associated with the mark by selling, assigning, or licensing the
17
trademark to a third party.
a. Trademark Licensing
Modern trademark law has recognized and legitimized the practice
18
of trademark licensing.
Trademark licensing permits the use of a
trademark on goods that may not “emanate directly from the trademark
19
owner,” but rather come from a selected third party—the licensee.
The policy behind the legitimization of trademark licensing, as endorsed
by Congress, is to expand the national and global value of trademarks in
the marketplace. When a licensing agreement is successful, the mark
becomes more widely known by consumers, increasing the mark’s
corresponding goodwill, and ultimately making the brand more valuable
for the mark’s owner. Trademark licensing has proliferated to such an
extent that an entire business models have become dependent on
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) defines a trademark as:
any word, symbol, or device or any combination thereof [that is] (1) used by a
person or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register. . . to identify or distinguish his or her
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–95 (1879).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), 1125(c).
17. “A trade name or mark is merely a symbol of goodwill; it has no independent
significance apart from the goodwill it symbolizes . . . [A] trademark cannot be sold or
assigned apart from the goodwill it symbolizes.” Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1984) (setting aside and reversing attachment and auction of a trademark apart from its
associated goodwill). Accord Berni v. Int’l Gourmet Restaurants, Inc., 838 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.
1988) (noting the “well-established principle” that a “mark is not property that may be
assigned ‘in gross’” and that “rights in a trademark cannot be sold apart from a going
business.”). See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 18:2 (4th ed. 2009).
18. KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314–15 (1988).
Not until the 1930’s did a trend develop approving of trademark licensing—so long
as the licensor controlled the quality of the licensee’s products—on the theory that a
trademark might also serve the function of identifying product quality for
consumers. And not until the passage of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act in 1946 did
that trend become the rule.
Id. (citations omitted).
19. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 18:39.
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licensing agreements with trademark owners. However, because the
goodwill behind a mark is a volatile commodity based on consumer
perception, a trademark owner must continue to exercise control over
20
the use of its mark in commerce.
b. Licensor Control
A trademark owner who licenses its mark has the duty to ensure a
21
licensee upholds the quality of a given product. A licensor who fails to
oversee the quality of its licensee’s products may not only tarnish the
mark, but may also lead a court to find the licensor has abandoned the
22
mark. Courts are concerned with control of licensees because of what
23
a mark embodies: it is a guard against consumer confusion and deceit.
The courts reason that without oversight a mark connotes nothing and is
24
without value in the marketplace.
In recent years, while courts have begun to ease this control
requirement, courts still require that a licensor be able to demonstrate
25
due diligence in supervising the use of its mark by licensees.
Accordingly, a licensor’s duty of control necessarily creates strict limits
on a licensee’s use of a mark. For example, a licensee must have the
26
express permission of a licensor to sub-license a mark. This restrictive
use is required “[b]ecause the owner of the trademark has an interest in
the party to whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the
good will, quality, and value of its products and thereby its
27
trademark . . . .”
Thus, the identity of a licensee is a critical and
28
material matter under trademark law.
The personal nature of trademark licenses and restrictions on
assignability create unique roadblocks for trademark licensees in

20. Id. § 18:42.
21. Id.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1127, 1604 (2006); see, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores,
Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment “With Goodwill”: A Concept Whose
Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 797 (2005).
26. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 18:43 (stating “[w]ithout specific authorization from
the trademark owner, the licensee’s right to use the licensed mark is personal and cannot be
sold or assigned to another”).
27. N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. Blanks (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc.), 337 B.R. 230, 236
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).
28. Id.
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bankruptcy.
Moreover, the unique nature of a trademark license
makes it a virtually irreplaceable commodity. Accordingly, a licensor
wields extraordinary power over a licensee: a licensor who chooses to
terminate a trademark license can unilaterally destroy a licensee’s
business. While trademark law is correct to afford great protection to
trademark licensors, those protections may also unnecessarily frustrate
the ability of a licensee to use a core asset of its business as leverage to
reorganize and preserve its business for its employees, customers, and
creditors.
2. Bankruptcy Law Purpose
The purpose of bankruptcy law is twofold: to treat creditors equally
according to their legal rights, and to give the honest debtor a fresh
30
start. That fresh start is made possible through the Bankruptcy Code
31
(the “Code”).
To the layperson, bankruptcy generally means the end of a
business—that it must sell off all of its wares and shut its doors forever.
This kind of bankruptcy is a Chapter 7 filing under the Code. Chapter 7
essentially creates a “forced sale” or liquidation that converts business
32
assets into cash. Proceeds from the liquidation are then distributed
33
among creditors according to priority.
However, bankruptcy may also serve as a means for a business to
resuscitate itself—much like The Sharper Image has done.
Reorganization is accomplished under Chapter 11 of the Code. Chapter
11 is effectively a system of negotiation among the participants in the

29. See In re Travelot Co., 286 B.R. 447, 455 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002) (“The grant of a
non-exclusive license is ‘an assignment in gross,’ that is, on personal to the assignee and thus
not freely assignable to a third party . . . .”).
30. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[I]t gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”). See also In re
Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (the goal of bankruptcy
is to maximize the estate); In re Central Ark. Broad. Co., Inc., 170 B.R. 143, 145 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1994) (stating property of the estate includes licenses and business goodwill).
Bankruptcy law, however, was not always so merciful. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 472 (1766) (stating “[Under Roman Law],
creditors might cut the debtor’s body into pieces, and each of them take his proportionate
share . . . .”) cited in DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY (INCLUDING BAPCPA): 21ST
CENTURY DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 6 (2d ed. 2006).
31. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 24–26.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 704.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 726. While the focus of Chapter 11 is reorganization, the Code also
allows for the sale of assets. 11 U.S.C. § 363.
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bankruptcy. The aim of a Chapter 11 reorganization is to reduce a
business’s expenses while allowing the business to keep its doors open
34
so that it may eventually become solvent again.
a. Overview of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Chapter 11 provides several mechanisms that allow a business to
reorganize. First, when a business files for Chapter 11 reorganization,
35
the debtor is granted a stay from creditors. The stay is a valuable
shield that prevents creditors from foreclosing on assets and suing the
36
debtor for money owed. Second, upon filing the debtor becomes a
“debtor-in-possession” to act as a fiduciary for the debtor’s creditors.
The fiduciary then takes control of the debtor’s property—known as the
37
“bankruptcy estate.” Meanwhile, unlike other kinds of bankruptcy,
the business continues operating and using property of the estate
38
according to a reorganization plan. If a plan is confirmed and the
debtor is successful in consummating that plan, then the debtor receives
39
its “fresh start.”
Because this Comment considers the use of highly personal
trademark rights in bankruptcy, it is necessary to develop further the
understanding of who controls a business during a Chapter 11
reorganization.
b. The Roles of the Debtor-in-Possession and the Chapter 11 Trustee
In a Chapter 11 reorganization, either a debtor-in-possession or
trustee takes the reins of the insolvent business. Under the Code, the
debtor-in-possession is essentially the debtor shed of its obligations to
40
its creditors. When a court determines that a third party must be

34. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
By permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue
to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners . . .
. Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in
a rehabilitated business than if “sold for scrap.”
Id.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (4).
36. Id.
37. 11 U.S.C § 541.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (providing “[u]nless the court, on request of a part in interest and
after notice and a hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor’s business.”);
11 U.S.C. § 1107 (stating “a debtor in possession shall have all the rights . . . of a trustee
serving in a case under this chapter”).
39. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 42.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1).
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appointed to run the business, the court removes the debtor from
control of the business and places control of the business in the hands of
41
a trustee. While this practice is disfavored among courts, it is necessary
in extraordinary circumstances where the current management has
42
committed fraud or is grossly mismanaging the business. However, the
prevailing policy is that a reorganization is likely to be more successful,
affordable, and expedient when the party most familiar with the
43
business is in control.
In the context of trademark licensees in bankruptcy, it is particularly
important to understand that a debtor-in-possession has essentially the
same rights, powers, and duties as a trustee. As this Comment will
explore later, at least one court has attempted to create a loophole by
construing the debtor-in-possession to have different rights from those
44
of a trustee.
However, according to legislative history, Congress
placed the debtor-in-possession “in the shoes of a trustee in every
45
way.”
The goal of the debtor-in-possession and the trustee is to maximize
46
the assets available to creditors. This means the debtor-in-possession
will reach to virtually every asset—including real property and ongoing
47
or executory contracts. In general, intellectual property licenses are
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(d).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a); see, e.g., In re The 1031 Tax Group, Inc., 374 B.R. 78, 85
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (recognizing that the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is an
“extraordinary remedy”).
43. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 232–34 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6191.
44. See In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (arguing the
terms “trustee” and “debtor-in-possession” have distinct meanings).
Nowhere does the Bankruptcy Code define “trustee” as synonymous with “debtor”
or “debtor in possession.” Quite the contrary, when the Bankruptcy Code refers to
both “trustee” and “debtor” (or “debtor in possession”) in the same statutory
provisions, the two terms are invariably invested with quite different meanings.
Id.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); see H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 232–34 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6360.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
47. Under § 541, the Code details what may be property of the estate—including “all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11
U.S.C. § 541. The term “executory contract” is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code,
however, the “Countryman” test is generally used by courts to make this determination. The
Countryman test defines an executory contract as “a contract under which the obligations of
both the bankrupt and the other party are so far unperformed that failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the
other.” Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Law: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV.
439, 460 (1973).
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48

i. Statutory Controls over Executory Contracts
An executory contract is an agreement in which both parties have
ongoing duties to one another. While the Bankruptcy Code does not
define the term, the characterization of a contract as “executory” is
critical to the determination of each party’s rights to the agreement.
Once a court finds that a contract, such as a trademark license, is
executory, the agreement is governed by § 365 of the Code. Section 365
49
requires a debtor to reject, assume, or assign executory contracts. A
debtor who rejects a contract is freed from obligations under the
contract; the other party to the contract is relegated to a claim against
50
the bankruptcy estate. Once an executory contract is rejected, it may
51
be resold to another person willing to pay a higher rate. A debtor also
52
has the choice to keep the contract through assumption. Or a debtor
may assume and assign the contract to a third party, subject to certain
53
limitations. Unlike assignment, a debtor who only assumes a contract
is not placing the contract in the hands of another party. However, the
circuit split that has been highlighted by N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc.
v. BG Star Productions essentially, and incorrectly, treats the
assumption of trademark licenses as if the license is being handed over
54
to a third party. Accordingly, this Comment will more fully explain
what it means to assume an executory contract.
ii. Assumption of an Executory Contract
A debtor who assumes its contracts is reaffirming those contracts for
which it has already paid and may have built its business around. The
Code requires that a debtor who seeks to assume an executory contract
must first cure any default or breach of the contract that is not related to
55
the debtor’s insolvency or bankruptcy. Moreover, the Code invalidates
48. 11 U.S.C. 365(e)(1); Menell, supra note 10, at 764–65 (“Trademark licenses are
almost always executory because the licensor has continuing quality control obligations and
the licensee typically has payment, reporting, marketing, and other continuing performance
obligations.”).
49. 11 U.S.C § 365(a), (f).
50. 11 U.S.C § 365(a).
51. PORT ET AL., supra note 13, at 536 (1999).
52. Id.
53. 11 U.S.C § 365(c)(1), (f).
54. See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009)
(denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2).
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any contract provisions requiring the forfeiture of the debtor’s rights
56
upon insolvency or bankruptcy. However, the Code does permit the
non-debtor to object to the assumption or assignment of an executory
contract in certain situations under § 365(c)(1).
iii. Objection to Assumption of an Executory Contract by Non-Debtor
Section 365(c)(1) has spurred multiple interpretations in bankruptcy
courts, district courts, and appellate courts. Section 365(c)(1) provides:
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or
lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties, if— (1) (A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the
debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance
from or rendering performance to an entity other than the
debtor or the debtor-in-possession, whether or not such contract
or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation
of duties; and (B) such party does not consent to such
57
assumption or assignment.
According to one scholar, the plain language interpretation of this
provision is that “if the estate wanted to assume, but not assign, a
contract that is nonassignable in law, the non-debtor could prevent
assumption of the contract, thus depriving the debtor of the benefit of
58
the bargain.” Yet, this harsh interpretation, which forms the basis of
the “hypothetical test” used by the majority of circuit courts, misstates
59
Congress’s intent and produces an illogical result.
As this Comment will further develop, the prevailing interpretation
of § 365(c)(1) produces a result that is inconsistent with the intent of the
Code. This interpretation provides that while a licensor may not
preemptively protect its licensed mark from becoming part of a
60
bankruptcy estate through an ipso facto contract clause, a licensor may
still later strip a debtor-licensee of its rights in a license even if the

56. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1).
58. Brett T. Cooke, Intellectual Property Licenses and Assignments under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code: A Brief Survey of the Nature Of Property Rights Conferred and
Implications Due to Reorganization, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 213, 223–24 (2007).
59. Id. at 224.
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e).
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licensee does not intend to assign the license to a third party.
If there is no concern that the debtor-licensee will turn the license
over to a third party and that the licensor will have to accept
performance from another, the protection granted to licensors under
this interpretation is unjustified. Further, if the license is a key asset of
the bankruptcy estate, stripping the debtor of its benefit frustrates the
entire purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization. Instead, this Comment
argues that where a debtor has no intent to assign the license, the debtor
62
should be permitted to assume the license.
While the argument set forth in this Comment offers a logical
approach to resolving the circuit split over the question presented in
N.C.P. Marketing Group, there is a key issue that must be resolved
63
before it can be adopted. First and foremost, Congress and the courts
must treat trademarks as intellectual property and afford trademark
licensees their due rights in bankruptcy.
B. The Conflict between Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law
Congress has failed to adequately secure trademark licensing rights
in bankruptcy on two fronts: (1) under the Bankruptcy Code,
trademarks are not considered intellectual property; and (2) Congress
has not squarely defined the rights of a trademark licensee who is a
debtor. The failure to resolve these two key questions has contributed
to the existing circuit split over a licensee’s rights to hold onto a
61. See N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009)
(denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.).
One arguable criticism of the hypothetical approach is that it purchases fidelity to
the Bankruptcy Code’s text by sacrificing sound bankruptcy policy . . . [T]he
hypothetical test provides a windfall to nondebtor parties to valuable executory
contracts: If the debtor is outside of bankruptcy, then the nondebtor does not have
the option to renege on its agreement; but if the debtor seeks bankruptcy protection,
then the nondebtor obtains the power to reclaim—and resell at the prevailing,
potentially higher market rate—the rights it sold to the debtor.
Id. See also Cooke, supra note 58, at 224.
62. See Cooke, supra note 58, at 224.
[While] [t]he majority of lower courts allow the debtor to assume an executory
contract when the debtor has shown an intent not to assign the contract…the
majority of the circuit courts . . . disallow assumption of a contract that cannot be
assigned under nonbankruptcy law regardless of whether or not the debtor intends
to assign it.
Id. See Menell, supra note 10, at 789 (stating “[t]he weight of scholarly opinion, emphasizing
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, the tension between subsections (c) and (f), and the
apparent intent of Congress as reflected in the legislative history, favors the application of the
actual test.”) (citing EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY, §§ 5–15, at 258–59 (1993)).
63. N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1578 (2009).
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trademark license through its Chapter 11 reorganization.
This part will look to legislative history to provide a brief overview
of how the current conflict between trademark law and bankruptcy law
emerged.
1. Trademarks Are Not Intellectual Property
Law students learn that intellectual property consists of three core
areas: patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Yet, under the U.S.
64
Bankruptcy Code, trademarks are not intellectual property. Rather,
the Code states, “‘intellectual property’ means (A) trade secret; (B)
invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C) patent
application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected under
title 17; or (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17; to the
65
extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law.” While peculiar,
Congress made an intentional choice to exclude trademarks, trade
66
names, and service marks as intellectual property in Bankruptcy cases.
The legislative history behind this definition of “intellectual
property” reveals a fundamental failure by Congress to recognize the
economic significance of trademarks.
The Code’s definition of
intellectual property came in the wake of Lubrizol Enterprises v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, a case decided at the outset of the
67
Information Age in 1984. That Fourth Circuit case held a licensor in
bankruptcy could strip a licensee of its right to use licensed
technology—a decision that sent license-dependent technology
68
industries into a panic. Computer and biotechnology companies feared
this case would allow the bankruptcy court to cut off critical licensing
69
agreements in one fell swoop—and possibly destroy their businesses.
Because of Lubrizol, members of the technology industry forecasted
a widespread chilling effect among hi-tech developers if Congress did
not intervene. As James Burger, chief counsel for Apple Computer,
explained to Congress in 1988, “[Lubrizol] undermines the utility of the

64. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A).
65. Id.
66. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3206 (1988).
67. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., The American Bankruptcy Institute Survey: Hearing on S. 1626, S. 1358, S.
1868, and S. 2279 (Bills pertaining to Title 11 of the U.S. Code, the Bankruptcy Code) Before
the Senate Subcomm. on Courts, and Administrative Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. (1989).
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license as a business tool.” If a licensee cannot be reasonably certain
that its license is secure, Burger told Congress, the licensee will not
71
make investments in the license. “[A]nything that does not assure the
licensee of his rights to a continuing license—assuming he pays the
required royalties himself—is counterproductive to licensing in general
and, therefore, counterproductive to the best use of assets to further
72
develop the American industrial system.”
Instead, given the unique nature of intellectual property, Burger and
other industry lobbyists argued that the protections afforded to
intellectual property licensees should align with those provided real
73
estate lessees. Like a lessee, a licensee is given possessory rights that
are less than the fee owner’s right, title, and interest in unique property.
And like a lessee who pays for the right not to be a trespasser, a licensee
pays for the right not to be an infringer. Under the Code, a landlord
74
may not unilaterally oust a tenant until the expiration of the lease.
Similarly, lobbyists argued a licensor should not be able to unilaterally
oust a licensee simply because of a bankruptcy filing.
Congress heeded to these concerns, if only narrowly, by enacting the
75
Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act (“IPLBA”) in 1988.
Through the IPLBA, Congress sought “to make clear that the rights of
an intellectual property licensee to use the licensed property cannot be
76
unilaterally cut off as a result of the rejection of the license.” In the
Senate version of the proposed bill, intellectual property was defined as
“inventions, designs, works of authorship, mask works, protected
information, trademarks, trade names, service marks, and other
products of intellectual or creative effort now or hereafter protected by

70. Intellectual Property Contracts in Bankruptcy: Hearing on H.R. 4657 Before the
House Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 21 (1988) (statement of James Burger, Apple Computer, Inc.).
71. Id. at 91.
72. Id.
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2006).
74. Intellectual Property Contracts in Bankruptcy: Hearing on H.R. 4657 Before the
House Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 23 (1988) (statement of James Burger, Apple Computer, Inc.). Congressional hearings
reveal that had IPBLA been the law at the time of the Lubrizol decision, “Lubrizol would
have retained its essential rights at that time, and there would have been a cash flow and a
basis on which a reorganization of the licensor could have been accomplished to the benefit
of all unsecured creditors.” Id. at 96. Instead, Lubrizol was “stripped of all its rights, to enable
the licensor to go out and peddle those rights somewhere else.” Id. at 95.
75. Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988).
76. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207.
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applicable non-bankruptcy law.”
Trademarks, trade names, and
service marks were further protected by providing that the licensor had
a duty “to permit existing grantees to continue in concert the quality
78
assurance procedures of the licensor.”
The bill was reviewed and
79
revised by the National Bankruptcy Conference. In its revision, the
Conference objected to the inclusion of trademarks as “intellectual
property”:
[B]y including trademarks, tradenames, and service marks in the
definition, the bill appears to bring every retail franchise
involving a trademark within the purview of the legislation, thus
extending the reach of the bill far beyond what appears
necessary the inclusion of trademarks also raises the thorny issue
of continuing quality assurance for trademarks in the midst of
bankruptcy, and the bill does not deal with this problem in an
80
adequate way.
Thus, the Conference suggests exclusion of trademarks, trade names,
and service marks is warranted because including them would open a
81
Pandora’s Box of extraneous issues. However, the true motivation for
the exclusion of these kinds of intellectual property seems to be more a
matter of expediency. This inference is supported by the Conference’s
own statement that it saw “no such emergency for and [had] no
particular interest in, extending such protection to trademarks
connected with traditional distributorships and retail businesses at this
82
time.”
Instead, the Conference argued, “trademarks should be
77. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act, S. 1626, 100th Cong. (1987).
78. Id.
79. The American Bankruptcy Institute Survey: Hearing on S. 1626, S. 1358, S. 1868, and
S. 2279 (Bills pertaining to Title 11 of the U.S. Code, the Bankruptcy Code) Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Courts, and Administrative Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 255 (1989).
80. Id. at 261.
81. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
[T]rademark…licensing relationships depend to a large extent on control of the
quality of the products or services sold by the licensee. Since these matters could not
be addressed without more extensive study, it was determined to postpone
congressional action in this area and to allow the development of equitable
treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts.
Id. See Xuan-Thao N. Nyguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1267, 1270
(2004); Patrick Law, Intellectual Property Licenses and Bankruptcy—Has the IPLBA Thawed
the “Chilling Effects” of Lubrizol v. Richmond Metal Finishers?, 99 COM. L.J. 261, 264 (1994).
82. The American Bankruptcy Institute Survey: Hearing on S. 1626, S. 1358, S. 1868, and
S. 2279 (Bills pertaining to Title 11 of the U.S. Code, the Bankruptcy Code) Before the Senate
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excluded from the legislation and left for further study and separate
83
treatment, hereafter, if necessary.”
So, while the technology sector of computer innovators and
biotechnology developers brought a compelling case for swift action by
Congress, the trademark lobby was swept aside. As a result, trademarks
are not afforded the same protections that other forms of intellectual
property are given in bankruptcy. Moreover, this lack of protection
makes trademark licensees vulnerable to unilateral rejections of their
licenses by licensors. This is a perilous risk not only for businesses
dependent on a trademark license, but also for such a business’s
creditors.
2. Rights of a Trademark Debtor-Licensee
The IPLBA offers a narrow solution to a narrow issue. While the
IPLBA was never broadened to include trademarks as intellectual
property, it also limited its solution to situations in which the debtor is
the licensor of the intellectual property. Since the IPLBA, Congress has
failed to provide a clear definition of a debtor-licensee’s rights in
bankruptcy. In absence of a clear answer, a split among the circuits has
emerged.
Regardless of the narrowness of the issue addressed by the IPLBA,
its analysis forms an instructive analytical framework to resolve the
existing split among the courts over how to treat trademark licensees in
bankruptcy. As Congress recognized in the development of the IPLBA,
a licensor does not simply have the right to void an executory contract
because of bankruptcy. Rather, by definition of an executory contract,
84
both parties to the agreement have ongoing obligations to each other.
While the current circuit split revolves around the rights of a licensee
in bankruptcy, the same reasoning that protects a licensee when its
licensor enters bankruptcy should apply: Licensees should not be
Subcomm. on Courts, and Administrative Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 344 (1989).
83. Id. at 345.
84. See supra note 47 for a discussion of executory contracts. See also Jason B.
Binford, Supreme Court Passes on Assumption and Assignment of Trademark License
Agreements, 28-JUN. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 83 (2009).
[B]y definition, every executory contract subject to § 365 imposes continuing
obligations on the part of the nondebtor party. Rather than using the common law
of trademarks to resolve the issue, the language of § 365(c)(1) indicates that a court
should consider the issue in the limited context of whether the identity of the
nondebtor party is significant under the particular facts at issue.
Id.
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stripped of their right to use a key asset, the licensing agreement, as
leverage for their “fresh start” where there is no risk that a licensor will
be forced to accept performance from a third party.
However, the prevailing analysis among courts rejects this argument.
Part II will introduce N.C.P. Marketing Group v. BG Star Productions
to explain the two analytical frameworks used by courts to determine
the rights of a trademark licensee in bankruptcy.
PART II
A. In re N.C.P. Marketing Group
Recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to a case that could
have provided some certainty for trademark licensees involved in
85
Chapter 11 proceedings. In N.C.P. Marketing Group, the Court was
asked to consider whether a firm that was a debtor-licensee of the Billy
Blanks TAE BO trademark could continue to use the license as a
86
bankruptcy asset.
While the Court recognized the paramount
importance of resolving this issue, it concluded this was not the proper
87
case to reach that resolution. However, the TAE BO case illuminates
the current state of affairs facing trademark licensees in bankruptcy.
This Part will address the development of the TAE BO case from the
lower courts to the Supreme Court.
1. The Genesis of TAE BO
In 1976, Billy Blanks was just a guy working out in his garage,
blasting the recently released “Rocky” theme song—“Gonna Fly
88
Now.” The champion-fighter imagery inspired Blanks, a martial arts
expert, to integrate boxing elements into a new fitness regimen he

85. N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (denying
petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1578.
The division in the courts over the meaning of § 365(c)(1) is an important one to
resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek reorganization. This
petition for certiorari, however, is not the most suitable case for our resolution of
the conflict. Addressing the issue here might first require us to resolve issues that
may turn on the correct interpretation of antecedent questions under state law and
trademark-protection principles.
Id.
88.
What
is
the
History
of
TAE
BO
Fitness?,
http://www.teamtaebo.com/AboutTaeBo.html.
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dubbed “TAE BO.” One journalist has described the program as a
90
“fist-pumping, high-flying hybrid of kick boxing and aerobics.”
Eventually, Blanks opened a TAE BO studio in Sherman Oaks,
91
California, where he garnered a retinue of devoted celebrities. Their
endorsements along with a successful infomercial campaign hawking
TAE BO videotapes, featuring Blanks clad in bold colors of musclebusting LYCRA unitards, created a successful fitness franchise by
92
1998.
A year later in 1999, Blanks entered into a licensing agreement with
N.C.P. Marketing Group (“N.C.P.”) to help him hawk even more
93
tapes.
That agreement granted N.C.P. the nonexclusive right to
advertise and sell products and services containing Blanks’s TAE BO
94
mark. However, soon after the agreement was made, the relationship
95
deteriorated. N.C.P. later breached the licensing agreement by failing
96
While an
to pay Blanks royalties on the TAE BO trademark.
arbitrator ordered N.C.P. to pay $2.1 million in royalties, N.C.P. instead
97
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In that bankruptcy, N.C.P. claimed
98
the TAE BO license as part of the bankruptcy estate. Blanks rejected
the license, arguing that under the Lanham Act, the license was not
99
assumable. In October 2004, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Nevada
agreed with Blanks, finding that N.C.P. did not have permission to
100
assume its licensing rights.
N.C.P. appealed. In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of
101
Nevada affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order. The district court held
that under federal trademark law, trademarks are personal to the
89. TAE BO stands for “T” =Total, “A”= Awareness, “E” = Excellent, “B” = Body,
“O” = Obedience. About Tae Bo, http://www.teamtaebo.com/AboutTaeBo.html.
90. James A. Fussell, Latest Craze Is ‘Same Old Stuff,’ Kick-Boxer Claims, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 23, 1999, at C7.
91. Id.
92. See
Billy
Blanks:
Biography
from
Answers.com,
http://www.answers.com/topic/billy-blanks; About the Creator of Tae Bo – Billy Blanks
About Billy, http://www.billyblanks.com/category/meet+billy/about+billy.do.
93. N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. Blanks (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc.), 337 B.R. 230
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).
94. Id. at 233.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 238.
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assignee, and therefore, nonassignable without the consent of the
licensor. As such, a trademark license may not be assumed by a debtor102
in-possession without the licensor’s consent.
The court based its
decision upon its interpretation of § 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.
B. Assumption of the License
In re N.C.P. Marketing Group asks whether a debtor-in-possession
may assume (continue to benefit from) a trademark license held by the
103
debtor before bankruptcy.
If so, a debtor-in-possession could
continue to receive the benefits of licenses to use the property of the
licensor. If not, a licensor could refuse assignment of rights by not
104
consenting to assignment or assumption.
Therefore, the outcome
hinged on the district court’s understanding of § 365(c)(1).
1. The In re N.C.P. Marketing Group Court’s Interpretation of
Bankruptcy Code § 365(c)(1)
The district court in In re N.C.P. Marketing Group first observed
that § 365(c)(1) “has been the subject of much controversy between
105
circuits.” Section 365(c)(1) operates as an exception to the rule that a
trustee may assume executory contracts, such as the license at issue in
106
this case, if the licensor objects.
As one court has recognized, “[t]he basic policy goal in place in [§]
365 is attempting to allow the debtor to realize the correct value of its
estate, while also providing some protection to the nondebtor
107
contracting party.”
Yet, the meaning of this statute has been
108
interpreted under two different views.
a. The Hypothetical Test
The first view strictly interprets the text of the statute by applying
the “hypothetical test.” That test asks whether, “hypothetically, without
looking to the individual facts of the case, any executory contracts could
102. Id. at 230–38 (“N.C.P. does not have the consent of the Blanks to license to third
parties at this time and therefore cannot assume the trademarks under [11 U.S.C. §]
365(c)(1).”).
103. Id. at 230.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 234.
106. Id. at 233.
107. Pa. Elec. Co. v. United Foundry Co., No. 06-200, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70399
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2009).
108. See infra Part III.
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be assumed under applicable federal law.”
Thus, § 365(c)(1) ties
nonassignability under “applicable law” to both assumption and
assignment in bankruptcy. The effect of this analytical framework is
that even if the debtor-in-possession has no intent to assign the license
to a third party, it still may not assume an executory contract if the
nondebtor objects and “applicable law” would bar assignment to a
hypothetical third party.
109

b. The Actual Test
The second view, which applies the “actual test,” asks “whether the
executory contract at hand, in actuality, can be assumed when applying
110
the applicable federal law.” Under the actual test, assumption by the
debtor-in-possession would be permitted and the nondebtor licensor
would not be able to object since the licensor would not actually have to
accept performance from a third party.
c. Applicable Federal Law
Neither Blanks nor N.C.P. contended that the trademark license was
an executory contract or that Lanham Act was the appropriate federal
111
law to apply.
However, the parties did “dispute whether applicable
trademark law would bar assignment to a third party without consent of
112
the assignor.”
To make this determination, the court drew analogies among other
113
forms of intellectual property. The court reasoned that like copyrights
and patents, trademarks “are personal and assignable only with the
consent of the licensor and therefore unassumable under [§]
114
365(c)(1).” The court further stated that unique, intangible nature of
trademarks warranted even greater protections for trademark licensors
115
“Trademarks are valuable
than licensors of patents or copyrights.
property rights that allow their owners to protect the good will of their
name and products by preventing unwarranted interference and use of

109. In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc., 337 B.R. at 234; Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc.
(In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1999) (analyzing whether
restrictions under federal patent law prohibit a debtor from either assuming or assigning an
executory patent license).
110. In re N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc., 337 B.R. at 234.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 235.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 236.
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their mark by others.” Thus, because trademark owners must protect
both the mark and the underlying business, there must necessarily be
absolute control over whether the trademark may be assigned to a third
117
party.
2. Critique of In re N.C.P. Marketing Group
Ultimately, the district court interpreted § 365(c)(1) to require
Blanks’s consent in order for N.C.P. to assume the license. Given the
acrimonious relationship between the parties, Blanks’s consent was
unattainable. Yet, the conclusion reached by the district court was
flawed for at least two reasons.
First, in line with the hypothetical test, the court imagines there is a
118
third party to whom the mark will be assigned. However, a debtor-inpossession is not a third party. Rather, the debtor-in-possession is the
debtor itself. When the identity of the licensee does not change, the
licensor is not being asked to consent to use of its mark by a third party.
And if there is no concern for interference by third parties that could
harm the licensor’s business or reputation, then concerns of consumer
confusion and infringement fall away.
Second, the district court maintains that trademark licensors are
entitled to a short leash on their licenses because they must ensure
119
quality control. However, as N.C.P. points out, that is not a primary
concern where the goods being marketed and sold come directly from
the licensor. As N.C.P. explained, “[t]he goods identified by the
licensed mark are [TAE BO] exercise videotapes manufactured from a
master tape created by Blanks. The product is genuine, regardless of
120
whether the licensee is N.C.P. or a third party.”
Moreover, the
trademark licensee also has a vested interest in maintaining the quality
of a mark. Not only is this generally a requirement of a licensing
agreement, but also the licensee shares an economic interest with the
licensor to ensure the success of the mark in the marketplace.
Thus, if there is no risk that a mark would be assigned to a third
party, no risk of consumer confusion, and no quality assurance concerns,
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 237 (“Because we find that under applicable trademark law, trademarks are
personal and non-assignable without the consent of the licensor, the Blanks’ trademark would
be unassumable as part of the bankruptcy estate of N.C.P. without the Blanks’ consent.”).
119. Id. at 236.
120. Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc.
v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129. S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (No. 08-463), 2009 WL 157088 at *6.
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the court’s reasoning that N.C.P. must have Blanks’s consent to use an
agreement, for which it had already paid and built is business around, is
flawed. By inferring facts that did not exist, the court granted near
monopolistic protections to trademark licensors and impaired a business
from seeking Chapter 11 reorganization.
C. Questions Remain: N.C.P. Marketing Group v. BG Star Productions
N.C.P. continued its fight to the Supreme Court. In 2009, the Court
121
reluctantly denied N.C.P.’s petition for a writ of certiorari. However,
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer, issued a statement explaining
that while the case before the Court was not an appropriate one through
which to issue a final determination of a debtor-licensee’s right to
122
assume an executory contract, the issue presented is a critical one.
Justice Kennedy noted in his statement that both the hypothetical
and actual tests are imperfect analytical frameworks to determine a
123
debtor-licensee’s right to assume a trademark.
For example, Justice
Kennedy noted that the hypothetical test results in a windfall to the
licensor by allowing it to accomplish something it could not accomplish
outside of bankruptcy—namely the ability to resell the license to the
124
debtor “at the prevailing, potentially higher market rate.”
Thus,
under the hypothetical test, a licensor is able to reap a substantial
benefit that comes at the detriment of the licensee.
And although the actual test is more closely aligned with “sound
bankruptcy policy,” Justice Kennedy recognized that the actual test also
125
has its shortcomings, primarily that the actual test may stray from the
126
plain text of the law.
While the Court was not prepared to resolve this important issue
through N.C.P. Marketing Group, hope remains that given an
appropriate case, the Court will provide a resolution. Until then, a
distinct split over this issue persists among the circuits.
Part III of this Comment recognizes that while the courts are split
121. N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009)
(denying petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.) (“I reluctantly agree with the
Court’s decision to deny certiorari.” ).
122. Id. (stating “the division in the courts over the meaning of § 365(c)(1) is an
important one to resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek
reorganization”).
123. Id. at 1577–78.
124. Id. at 1577.
125. Id. at 1578.
126. Id.
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and no resolution seems imminent from the Supreme Court or from
Congress, the interests of trademark law and bankruptcy law can be best
served through the analytical framework of the actual test, rather than
the hypothetical test.
PART III
A. Conjunction Junction, What Is Your Function: Explaining the Circuit
Split
Whether a court applies the hypothetical or actual test to determine
the rights of a trademark debtor-licensee essentially depends on how
127
that court construes the function of the conjunction “or” in § 365(c).
As the In re Footstar court recognized, “[t]he threshold issue . . . is a
question of statutory interpretation—must the word ‘or’ in the statutory
language ‘assume or assign’ be read literally, i.e., as a disjunctive, or
should it be construed in context as the functional equivalent of the
128
conjunction ‘and.’”
While the In re N.C.P. Marketing Group court
read the provision disjunctively to apply the hypothetical test, the case
could have had a different outcome in a circuit that reads the provision
conjunctively to apply the actual test. Part III offers a brief overview of
the differing statutory interpretations among the circuits.
1. The Hypothetical Test
The Ninth, Third, and Fourth Circuits read § 365(c)(1) disjunctively
and apply the hypothetical test. In these circuits, a debtor-licensee who
does not have the power to assign a license under the applicable law
without the licensor’s consent also may not assume the license even if
the debtor has no intent to assign the license.
a. The Ninth Circuit: In re Catapult Entertainment
The Ninth Circuit applied the hypothetical test in In re Catapult
129
Entertainment. In that case, a Chapter 11 debtor proposed to assume
127. Schoolhouse Rock!: Conjunction Junction (ABC television broadcast 1973), lyrics
available at http://www.schoolhouserock.tv/Conjunction.html (stating “And then there’s ‘or’:
O-R, when you have a choice like ‘This or that.’). Generations of children have learned the
grammatical function of a conjunction from the famous Schoolhouse Rock cartoon
“Conjunction Junction.” Id. The cartoon uses train cars to illustrate that the function of
conjunctions is “[h]ooking up words and phrases and clauses.” But, as the cartoon warns, one
must “watch that function.” Id.
128. In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 569 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Perlman v. Catapult
Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 754 (9th Cir. 1999).
129. In re Catapult, 165 F.3d 747.
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130

a patent license as part of its reorganization plan.
The licensor
131
objected. The court agreed with the licensor, holding that the debtorin-possession could not assume an executory contract over the licensor’s
objection if applicable law would bar assignment to hypothetical third
party, even where a debtor-in-possession has no intention of assigning
132
the contract in question to any such third party.
The court supported its reasoning by arguing that federal patent law
133
made nonexclusive patent licenses personal and nondelegable.
That
characterization, the court stated, bars a debtor from assuming patent
134
While the court considered
licenses without the licensor’s consent.
applying the actual test, it quickly jettisoned that test stating the actual
135
test requires an unjustified “judicial rewrite” of the statute:
“[T]hat
the plain language of § 365(c)(1) may be bad policy does not justify a
judicial rewrite. And a rewrite is precisely what the actual test
136
requires.”
However, by not permitting Catapult to continue using the license,
the licensor doomed its licensee’s business. Without the license,
Catapult had no product. With no product, Catapult was no longer an
on-going concern and could not successfully complete a Chapter 11
reorganization.
Meanwhile, as the Supreme Court has noted, the licensor was free to
137
sell the crucial license to another, perhaps higher bidder.
Catapult
demonstrates the Court’s concern that the hypothetical test frustrates
the purpose of bankruptcy and gives the licensor powers it would not
138
ordinarily have.
b. The Third Circuit: In re West Electronics
The Catapult court followed In re West Electronics in holding that
the hypothetical test applies where a debtor-in-possession seeks to
139
assume an executory contract.
However, West did not involve the
130. Id. at 749.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 754–55.
133. Id. at 750.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 754.
136. Id.
137. See N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (denying
petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.).
138. Id.
139. In re West Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988).
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rights of an intellectual property licensee. Rather, the question in West
was whether the debtor, a defense contractor, could assume its
140
government contract to manufacture military equipment.
The court
held the debtor could not assume the executory contract without
consent from the government because applicable law barred assignment
141
of the contract to a third party. The court recognized that such a bar
was necessary to keep the government contractor directly accountable
for any breach and to protect the government from having to accept
142
performance from a third party.
West argued that the applicable law
did not bar assumption by its debtor-in-possession since the debtor-in143
possession is the debtor itself and not a third party. The court rejected
that argument, stating “the relevant inquiry is not whether [applicable
law] would preclude an assignment from West as a debtor to West as a
debtor in possession, but whether it would foreclose an assignment by
144
West to another defense contractor.” Therefore, because West could
not assign its contract to a hypothetical third party, its debtor-inpossession also had no “legally cognizable” right to assume the contract
145
in its bankruptcy.
Through this logic, the West court incorrectly
construed the meaning of § 365(c) to require the hypothetical test.
While, the West court recognized the government had a right to keep
its contract out of the hands of a third party, it went a step too far in
holding that the debtor and the debtor-in-possession were two distinct
146
entities. Rather, the Code does not view the debtor-in-possession as a
147
third party, but rather as the debtor itself. Further, the Code does not
seek to strip a Chapter 11 debtor’s rights. Rather, the Code seeks to
protect and preserve the rights of the debtor.
Without these
protections, the debtor would have few incentives to file for Chapter 11
reorganization.

140. Id.
141. Id. at 82 (citing 41 U.S.C. § 15 (2006)).
142. Id. at 83.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 83–84.
146. Id. at 84 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not
believe that a ‘solvent contractor and an insolvent debtor in possession going through
bankruptcy,’ . . . are different entities for the purposes of the Non-Assignment Clause.”).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 232–34 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6360.
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c. The Fourth Circuit: In re Sunterra Corp.
Despite the shortcomings of the hypothetical test, the Fourth
Circuit has also applied this analysis to determine the rights of a debtor148
licensee.
The court in In re Sunterra Corp. employed the plain
meaning rule to reject the actual test, and deny Sunterra the right to
149
assume a software license in its bankruptcy.
Sunterra, a vacation
timeshare operator, held a nonexclusive license to use software for its
150
timesharing business.
Sunterra bought the software license for $3.5
151
The company then invested $38 million to design its own
million.
unique system to manage timeshare rights at its various resort
152
locations. In 2000, Sunterra filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and sought
153
to assume its software license. However, like the licensor in Catapult,
Sunterra’s licensor filed a motion to have the court reject Sunterra’s
154
license. The court sided with the licensor, reasoning that because the
applicable law—copyright law—restricted the transfer of the license,
155
Sunterra could not assume the license without the licensor’s consent.
As in Catapult, the licensor denied the licensee the right to benefit
from a contract for which it had already paid and relied upon for its
156
business.
Thus, the unforeseen consequence of filing for
reorganization was that Sunterra was forced to give up a significant
asset of its estate. Moreover, because the court deemed the license to
be rejected, the licensor could then later renegotiate the license and
demand a higher royalty rate from the licensee. Again, Sunterra
illustrates how the hypothetical test often yields a windfall to the
157
licensor at the detriment of the debtor-licensee.
2. The Actual Test: The First Circuit
Under the “actual test” the court must make a case-by-case inquiry
148. See, e.g., RCI Technology Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d
257 (4th Cir. 2004).
149. Id. at 265.
150. Id. at 271–72.
151. Id. at 261.
152. Id. at 260–61.
153. Id. at 261.
154. Id. at 262, n.7 (stating “copyright law is the applicable nonbankruptcy law that
would excuse [the licensor] from accepting performance under the [a]greement from an
entity other than Sunterra.”).
155. Id. at 271–72.
156. Id. at 261.
157. See N.C.P. Mktg. Group v. BG Star Prods., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1577 (2009) (denying
petition for certiorari) (statement of Kennedy, J.).
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to determine “whether the nondebtor party . . . actually was being
‘forced to accept performance under its executory contract from
someone other than the debtor party with whom it originally
158
contracted.’” The First Circuit, along with a majority of lower courts,
has taken the view that the courts should apply an “actual test” in
construing the statutory language so as to permit assumption where the
debtor-in-possession has no intention to assign the contract.
The court in Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech, applied the more
logical analysis that first asks whether the debtor is actually trying to
impose performance of the contract by a third party upon the licensor
159
before stripping away the debtor-licensee’s rights. In Institut Pasteur,
a patent licensor objected to a licensee’s use of its patents in bankruptcy
160
The licensor argued that the licensee’s sale of
based upon § 365(c).
stock to the licensor’s competitor was a de facto “assignment” of a non161
assignable license under patent law.
The licensee argued that the
licenses were merely assumed into the bankruptcy estate, and that the
162
licenses were “indispensable” to the success of its reorganization. The
licensor argued that because of the stock sale, it would effectively be
forced to accept performance from a third party, which the applicable
163
patent law prohibited.
The licensor further argued that the licensee
was pulling a fast one—that while in form the licensee sought only to
assume the license, but in reality it was seeking to assign the license to a
164
third party. The court foreclosed that argument, citing another First
165
Circuit case—In re Leroux.
166
In In re Leroux, the First Circuit rejected the hypothetical test.
Instead, the court held that § 365(c) contemplated a pragmatic “case-bycase inquiry” into whether the licensor really would have to accept
167
performance from a third party.
Likewise, in Institut Pasteur, the
158. Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997) (emphasis in original) (quoting Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp.
v. Leroux (In re Leroux), 69 F.3d 608, 612 (1st Cir.1995)).
159. Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997).
160. Id. at 490.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 491.
163. Id. at 493.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux (In re Leroux), 69 F.3d 608, 612
(1st Cir.1995)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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court applied the actual test and looked to whether the debtor-licensee
actually sought to assign the license to a third party. Because the
debtor-licensee sought only to continue its business and use the license
as it had before its bankruptcy, the court permitted the debtor-licensee
168
to assume the patent licenses.
Thus, in reaching its decision, the court weighed the potential risk to
the licensor in allowing the debtor-licensee to assume the patent license.
Finding no risk to the licensor, the court allowed the licensee to
continue using a valuable bankruptcy asset essential for its
169
reorganization—allowing the debtor to achieve its “fresh start.”
B. An Alternative: In re Footstar
But, perhaps, as at least one court has recognized, this entire debate
over a conjunction is for naught. Instead, as the In re Footstar court
suggests, § 365(c)(1) should be read even more plainly.
In Footstar, the bankruptcy court concluded that use of the term
“trustee” in § 365(c)(1) is not a synonym for the term “debtor-inpossession,” as the other circuits have read it to be. Rather, the court
argued the terms have distinct meanings so that the prohibition against
assignment and assumption under § 365(c)(1) is explicitly limited to
situations in which the trustee, not the debtor-in-possession, seeks to
170
assume an executory contract.
Thus, while the debtor-in-possession
could not assign the contract and force the licensor to accept
performance from a third party, the debtor-in-possession could still
171
assume the executory contract.
As the court stated, to construe
“trustee” in § 365(c)(1) to mean “debtors” or “debtors in possession”
172
would defy the “plain meaning” of the statute as written by Congress.
However, that is not the intent of Congress and unfortunately, the
resolution of this issue is not as simple as the Footstar court would like.
Congress has clearly stated that in Chapter 11, the debtor-in-possession
173
has the same rights as the trustee.
168. Id. at 495 (stating the licensee “remains in all material respects the legal entity
with which [the licensor] freely contracted, [the licensor] has not made the required
individualized showing that it is or will be deprived of ‘the full benefit of [its] bargain’”).
169. Id. at 495.
170. In re Footstar, Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 573 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also In re
Aerobox Composite Structures, LLC, 373 B.R. 135, 140–42 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007).
171. In re Footstar, 323 B.R. at 575.
172. Id. at 570–71.
173. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 407 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6360.
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CONCLUSION
As the rate of Chapter 11 filings increases along with the value of
trademark licenses, it is more important than ever that Congress and the
courts answer the question of whether a debtor-licensee may assume a
nonassignable trademark license.
The prevailing hypothetical test unfairly provides a windfall for
licensors while stripping debtor-licensees of trademark rights that are
essential to their ability to keep a business going and to reach a
successful reorganization under Chapter 11. Not only is this result
contrary to the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code, it also provides
extraordinary monopolistic powers to trademark licensors. While the
Bankruptcy Code has excluded trademarks from the protections given
to other forms of intellectual property, Congress has recognized that the
rights of intellectual property licensees may not be stripped away simply
because of a bankruptcy. This reasoning should be applied to
trademark licensees in bankruptcy who seek only to use the license as
leverage to obtain a “fresh start.” The actual test, which asks whether in
fact a licensor will have to accept performance from a third party,
balances the concerns of both bankruptcy law and trademark law.
In absence of congressional action, courts should adopt the actual
test to balance the need for business reorganization and the need for a
trademark licensor to exercise control over its mark. Under this
analytical framework, both debtor-licensees and nondebtor-licensors
will reap the benefit of their bargain.
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